Analytica Camillus

Morality in Ruthlessness

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Chinese Anti-Access/Area-Denial and the South China Sea by Martin Andrew, PhD

Preface1

The paper will examine how China intends to use an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability in the South China Seas.  Technologically driven the paper has a brief introduction, looks at the systems involved and then regional reactions.  China is a victim of its own geo-strategic circumstances requiring the sea to export its products and receive its raw materials. Much of the raw materials for its economy come through the South China Sea.  The Chinese military are looking at ways to control the South China Sea and negate foreign forces, especially the United States navy, from operating in these waters.

In 1947 the Guomindang government released a map claiming the sovereignty over the entire South China Sea.  Not recognised by any other nation, the Chinese Government in late July 2010 repeated its claim to have “indisputable sovereignty” over islands in the South China Sea and the surrounding waters’. Taiwan also claims sovereignty over the South China Sea, but unlike China, does not use force to enforce it.  China views the ‘First Island Chain’ as its own area of primary strategic importance, the East and South China Seas and also talks wanting to influence events out the Second Island Chain which extends out to Guam.     

 The Chinese government views any interference in what it sees as its territorial waters in the South China Sea very seriously.3  It is turning a coral atoll it claims  sovereignty over in the Spratley Islands into a proper island, in the hope of furthering its claim.4 Before the 2010  Second ASEAN-US Summit, Beijing warned the US to stay out of the South China Sea dispute.5  Since the end of the Vietnam War there have been three major incidents showing how the South China Sea has the ability to quickly become a flash point; the sinking a Vietnamese transport ship and landing craft on 14 March 1988, the accidental collision between the Chinese F-8IIM fighter and the US Navy EP-3E on 1 April 2001; the 8 March 2009 incident between five Chinese vessels and the USNS Impeccable in international waters off Hainan Island, and recently the interception and barrel roll by a Chinese fighter over a P-8.  

If China decided to assert its claim on the South China Sea by force, it could probably control the northern part if it were contested by any regional power, using  Hainan Island to provide air cover.  It has a large submarine force, including nuclear attack submarines utilizing its submarine base and airfield with aircraft shelters built into caves including one large enough to house 12 Xian H-6K bombers on the island.  There is also an airfield capable on Woody island in the Paracel Islands capable of operating a small number of J-10 and J-11 combat aircraft fighter jets -and a small helicopter pad on Mischief Reef off the Philippines coast. If it were contested it would likely back down. The USNS Impeccable returned after the 8 March incident escorted by the United States destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon, and no further incidents occurred. 

The planned introduction of three new aircraft carriers will change the capability of the PLAN.  The cost of three carrier battle groups is seeing the PLAN employing technology to compensate for numbers as the acquisition and operating costs of fixed wing carriers will see money become limited for new hulls.  The 20 plus  Type 56 corvettes for example are replacing 70 Type 37 submarine chasers. The new corvettes will be used for patrol and presence duties in areas like the Spratly islands and the East Asia Seas.

Further the need for escorts for the aircraft carrier and new LHD mean that modern escorts available to assert a contested claim in the East and South China Sea will be reduced, and could rely more on submarines with perhaps the Coastguard taking over many of the surface patrol missions.

Currently the PLAN will resembles the Royal Navy surface fleet of 1979 in numbers of surface combatants’ similar contemporary capability, but lacking the fleet logistics train to perform major operations away from its shores in any great numbers.  However, in the East and South China seas it could muster a large proportion of its combat fleet.

 In the southern area of the South China Sea, the PLAN’s strength is in its submarine fleet as the countries claiming parts of South China Sea, have no modern large fixed wing maritime surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft, relying on two aging Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) AP-3C Orion aircraft
flying out of Butterworth, Malaysia.  

Regional Concerns

The nations bordering the South China Sea are concerned over China’s claim and expanding naval power; coupled with the fear that the United States might pull back from Asia.   President Clinton’s decision to send two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait in 1996 was warmly, if not openly, welcomed inside ASEAN who have always been concerned about the South China Sea, especially after the Chinese started to garrison Mischief Reef.   

The Second ASEAN-US Summit was front page news in ASEAN newspapers and the lead story in television news.  The South China Sea territorial dispute with China was prominent is the discussions and the US pledged to support ASEAN’s stand to act as a bloc in discussions with China over maritime security and freedom of navigation through international sea lanes.6  This has scuttled China’s plans for bilateral discussions with individual claimants and Beijing reacted angrily towards United States support for ASEAN’s decisions.  Malaysia and Brunei recently settled their dispute over ownership their oil and gas fields in the South China Sea.7  

Vietnam is increasing its forces into an area denial anti-access strategy and will be discussed later.  A submarine fleet is being developed, shore based anti-ship missiles have been acquired and it has a small but strong fighter which will continue to make it an increasingly formidable A2/AD capability.

Now for major areas of concern as ASEAN has major internal rifts which could unsettle any regional response to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. In Southeast Asia, nothing is at it seems, with shadow plays behind any public decision.  Indonesia sees itself as the leader of ASEAN and like Singapore is taking a ‘watch and see’ approach towards the Chinese, whilst it has emphasised the need to increase its air defence and naval forces.  These would be hard pressed to protect and patrol its 12,000 islands as well as the Malacca and Sunda Straits. 

Australia cannot be expected to continue to foot the bill for regional broad area maritime reconnaissance and surveillance as the Royal Australian Air Force will retire its AP-3C aircraft by the end of the decade for eight P-8 maritime reconnaissance aircraft which can be supplemented by Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft in the surface search role.  ASEAN nations have to start looking at their fixed (and rotary wing) maritime patrol and anti-submarine assets. 

Malaysia and Indonesia arguments over EEZ and island ownership especially after Sipitan and Ligitan Islands being handed over to Malaysia markedly affect relations between them.  A mini-Konfrontasi is occurring with some Indonesians excepting it to escalate. This occurred in the early 1990s over Sipitan and Ligitan, with the decision to award the two islands to Malaysia only hardening the Indonesian’s resolve. Continued Malaysian paternalistic/poor cousin attitudes towards Indonesians does not bode well either. 

The Philippines have announced that they will be refurbishing their islands in the Spratley Island Chain and are the ones most likely after Vietnam to come into contact with Chinese ‘coastguard’ vessels.  Initially against US support, the government has embraced it, although now anything is possible under President Duterte.  

In Brunei the Chinese assertiveness has had an unintended benefit towards the local ethnic Chinese population, some of whom were born in Brunei.  The government has made an ethnic-Chinese Brunei citizen the deputy Foreign Minister and economic and political restrictions against ethnic Chinese in Brunei have been quietly removed or significantly reduced.

The Brunei Defence Force is attempting to become more professional but training is still an issue due to it having a very small and wealthy population.9  The low price of oil is affecting modernisation plans with the planned three CN-235 maritime patrol aircraft now reduced to a single aircraft. This is insufficient to provide effective coverage of its oil and natural gas fields but does allow for training to be kept current.   Both the Philippines and Malaysia, on current procurement announcements, are not giving sufficient weight to maritime patrol aircraft.  The Brunei’s oil and gas fields are also the only part of the South China Sea that has not suffered from over-fishing.  

China’s Strategic A2/AA Assets

The dramatic rise of China’s economy now sees China’s military talking about asymmetric warfare and the employing of an assassin’s mace to defeat an adversary’s high technology systems.   Such a major technological and strategic event occurred at 1728 hours EST on 11 January 2007, when a Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) missile hit a defunct Chinese weather satellite at an altitude of 869km as it passed over China.   Timed to coincide with the United States Senate Armed Services Committee Annual Threat Assessment sitting later that day in Washington D.C.; it sent the message that China now had an ASAT capability and that U.S. satellites over  China, and by implication Taiwan, were no longer safe.  

Over seven later Chinese leadership continues to fund both nuclear and conventional offensive and defensive strategic weapons to conduct anti-access and area denial operations beyond them.  Not being bound by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty the Chinese have developed a large number of mobile short and intermediate range ballistic missiles.  The number and sophistication of these systems continue to grow, some are now armed precision guided warheads, is causing concern in both Washington and Moscow. Guam and almost all of Russia are within range of China’s intermediate range ballistic missiles.10

The Assassin’s Mace: China’s Anti-satellite and Anti-ship Ballistic Missile systems and Sensors

The then Secretary of the US Air Force, James J Roche, in an April 2002 speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Doolittle Award ceremony noted that a bandwidth of 40 Gigabytes was required just for the early days of US operations in Afghanistan.  He warned that the increasing use of satellites could lead to issues if they became unavailable.  The Chinese had already focused on this key vulnerability, the Achilles heel of information operations, and started developing their current national missile defence (NMD) system in 1990.11   The anti-satellite test of 11 January 2007 was a cover for the third of a series of anti-ballistic missile tests, the first two were conducted on 7 July 2005 and 6 February 2006.  It showed that the PLA was also capable of knocking out satellites and an intermediate range ballistic missile, the former showing they could interfere with US information dominance.  Conversely the United States is capable of doing the same back with its land based Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) and sea based Standard SM-3 ABM systems.

China’s first successful ASAT weapon was launched by a modified road mobile DF-21 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), or its civilian derivative the KT-1, from a Chinese manufactured transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).12  The DF-21 is the land- based version of China’s J-1 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

Described by the Director of the United States Defense Intelligence Agency as a SE-19 kinetic kill vehicle (KKV), being road mobile enables the launcher, along with communications and maintenance vehicles, to be deployed on the best axis to intercept a satellite and making it virtually impossible to target before launch.   PLA forces invading another country could bring along an ASAT as part of their corps assets to destroy Russian reconnaissance satellites looking at their forces if they were in a Central Asian country.  

The linking of China’s robust and numerous ASAT sensor sites enables the Second Artillery Corps to track and provide precise targeting data for its ASAT missile system.  

It also provides redundancy in the event of an attack on one or more tracking facilities.  There are eight satellite ground tracking stations, along with the space and satellite launch facilities at Taiyuan, Wuzhai and Jinquan, supplementing by four maritime tracking and control ships and two external ground stations in Kiribati and Namibia.13 To this must be included the PLA’s early warning and tracking radars which form part of the HQ-9 and S-300 SAM systems.   

All these sensors provide early warning and tracking data to cue the 16.5m width square rotatable  large phased array radar located at KuErle (Korla) near Bayinguoleng in Xinjiang.14  This provides tracking data for anti- satellite and ballistic missile interceptors launched nearby.  

Intercepting an incoming warhead in a test is not a difficult achievement if you have missiles capable of entering the upper atmosphere and good tracking radars.  The Nike-Zeus system intercepted 10 out of 14 warheads in 1962 although this was with nuclear warheads.15  The first successful non-nuclear intercept of a dummy Minuteman ICBM warhead in flight was on 10 June 1984 by an infra-red guided kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) which unfurled a 4.2 metre metal net containing 36 spines.16  

DF-21D and DF-26 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile17

The road mobile DF-21 is China’s primary intermediate long range missile system and can strike Guam. The missile is also the basis of the new anti-ship ballistic missile which uses technology from the 1973 Soviet SS-NX-13 (KH-9) anti-ship SLBM which has yet to be tested. 

Initial targeting is to be by over the horizon back scatter (OTH-B) radar which has issues with coverage and interference of civilian and military communications.  Current planning envisages one OTH-B radar extending over a 600 arc covering the East China Sea from Shanghai outwards to nearly all of the Philippines, missing out much of the South China Sea.  Mid-course guidance will be by satellite borne radars with a nose mounted optical correlator providing terminal guidance. 

I do not believe the system will work as claimed.  To date the Chinese have not demonstrated a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MARV) or the seeker technology.  The Russians never found a way to remove the seeker’s cover and rapidly cool the seeker quickly enough upon entering the earth’s atmosphere, to acquire and track a moving target and then manoeuvre a large warhead onto it in a short space of time.  Let alone a target moving at 30 knots, meaning it could manoeuvre out of a seeker’s search ‘cone’, employing simple countermeasures like smoke and infra-red obscurants, and performing avoidance manoeuvres.  The Standard SM-3 Block IB anti-ballistic missile has been at sea on US Navy Aegis vessels since 2014 and the SM-3 Block IIA is due into service in 2018 with a larger 21-inch diameter booster improving speed and range along with a larger kinetic warhead.18 

Maritime Patrol and Strike Aircraft in the East and South China Seas and the First Island Chain19

The People’s Liberation Army Navy currently operate the H-6K, armed with YJ-100 long range  anti-ship missiles out to the ‘First Island Chain, Nansha (Spratly) Island Group  and East China Seas.  to deter an aggressor.  

The YJ-100 has a range of 800km but lacks the satellite communications and a mid-course targeting system to take advantage of the range of the missile.  The US Navy converted its Anti-ship Tomahawk cruise missiles to land attack variants due to the difficulty, even with mid-course guidance of targeting a ship, let alone the correct ship, in the 40 plus minutes it would take for a missile to reach the area of the target at that range.

Since 2012 the H-6K has been deployed with up to six CM-802AKG  (KD-88/A) missiles designed for littoral warfare utilising a nose mounted EO (IIR?) seeker and data link with the ‘man in the loop’  providing individual targeting when required.  The missile can obviously be used for land attack missions.

Land based J-20s are expected to have the range to go beyond the ‘First Island Chain’.

Xian H-6K Long Range Maritime Strike/Cruise Missile Carrier20 

With the introduction of the Xian H-6K, a heavily modified Tu-16 Badger with new D-30 KPII turbofans replacing the 1940s designed RD-3M turbojets  and advanced avionics the PLAAF has a maritime strike/cruise missile carrier able to operate up to 3,300km from the Chinese coastline.  The new turbofans have more thrust with a specific fuel consumption (SFC) almost half of the previous power plants, and a bomb bay fuel tank is also carried.  The H-6K can carry up to 9,000kg of ordnance including carrying up to either, four YJ-63 anti-ship cruise missiles; six HJ-12 or KD-88/A anti-ship cruise missiles; or six CJ-10 land-attack cruise missiles under the wings on single pylons. 

A six round rotary launcher is under development for the H-6K which will enable an overload capacity of 12 KD-88/A anti-ship cruise missiles, replacing the bomb bay fuel tank.  The existing H-6 bomb bay is 6.58m long with a width of 1.8m with the doors open, and as the fuselage is approximately 20% wider it could easily accommodate a six round rotary launcher, at the expense of range.

YJ-8 Long Range Anti-Shipping Missile on the Improved Type 037G Conventional Submarine21

The improved Type 039G conventional submarine, employs air-independent propulsion for extended underwater operations and can carry and launch encapsulated YJ-8 submarine launched long range anti-ship missiles, a variant of the shipborne YJ-62.  The PLAN has the capability to launch land-attack cruise missiles from submerged submarines.

China’s response to Regional Militaries Rearming

China’s New Island

The recent concerns over China building an island in the Spratly Island group should hardly have been a surprise to anyone watching the region.

The island has been built to enhance China’s claim to the South China sea and militarily is much of a non-event.  A long range radar could be placed on it for surveillance and to claim an air-defence identification zone, which would be promptly ignored.

The 10 August 2012 issue of Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily) did an extensive article on it noting that in 1982, the Xinhua News Agency broadcasting a message that to build the island, the first coconut tree had been planted.22 

In August 2012 it contained over 7,000 trees and over 5,000 square metres of vines and the permanent garrison was well established. Sand on coral does not allow for underground or heavy structures.  The base is easily disrupted with 2,000lb bombs, or 5-inch shell fire.  The airfield will be used primarily for resupply and for emergency landings.

The nations bordering the South China Sea are concerned over China’s claim and expanding naval power.   President Clinton’s decision to send two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait in 1996 was warmly, if not openly, welcomed inside ASEAN who have always been concerned about the South China Sea, especially after the Chinese started to garrison Mischief Reef.   

The Second ASEAN-US Summit in 2010 was front page news in ASEAN newspapers and the lead story in television news.  The South China Sea territorial dispute with China was prominent is the discussions and the US pledged to support ASEAN’s stand to act as a bloc in discussions with China over maritime security and freedom of navigation through international sea lanes.23  This has scuttled China’s plans for bilateral discussions with individual claimants and Beijing reacted angrily towards United States support for ASEAN’s decisions.  Malaysia and Brunei recently settled their dispute over ownership their oil and gas fields in the South China Sea.24  

Now for major areas of concern as ASEAN has major internal rifts which could unsettle any regional response to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. In Southeast Asia, nothing is at it seems, with shadow plays behind any public decision.  Indonesia sees itself as the leader of ASEAN and like Singapore is taking a ‘watch and see’ approach towards the Chinese, whilst it has emphasised the need to increase its air defence and naval forces.  These would be hard pressed to protect and patrol its 12,000 islands as well as the Malacca and Sunda Straits. 

Australia cannot be expected to continue to foot the bill for regional broad area maritime reconnaissance and surveillance as the Royal Australian Air Force will retire its AP-3C aircraft by the end of the decade for eight P-8 maritime reconnaissance aircraft which can be supplemented by Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft in the surface search role.  ASEAN nations have to start looking at their fixed (and rotary wing) maritime patrol and anti-submarine assets. 

Malaysia and Indonesia arguments over EEZ and island ownership especially after Sipidan and Ligitan Islands being handed over to Malaysia markedly affect relations between them.  A mini-Konfrontasi is occurring with some Indonesians excepting it to escalate. This occurred in the early 1990s over Sipitan and Ligitan, with the decision to award the two islands to Malaysia only hardening the Indonesian’s resolve.25  Continued Malaysian paternalistic/poor cousin attitudes towards Indonesians does not bode well either. 

The Philippines are refurbishing their islands in the Spratley Island Chain and are the ones most likely after Vietnam to come into contact with Chinese ‘coastguard’ vessels.  Initially against US support they now embrace it.  

In Brunei the Chinese assertiveness has been had an unintended benefit towards the local ethnic Chinese population, some of whom were born in Brunei.  The government has made an ethnic-Chinese Brunei citizen the deputy Foreign Minister and economic and political restrictions against ethnic Chinese in Brunei have been quietly removed or significantly reduced.

The Brunei Defence Force is attempting to become more professional but training is still an issue due to it having a very small and wealthy population.26  With its  three CN-235 maritime patrol aircraft it should be able to provide effective coverage of its oil and natural gas fields if the training is kept current.   Both the Philippines and Malaysia, on current procurement announcements, are not giving sufficient weight to maritime patrol aircraft.  The Brunei’s oil and gas fields are also the only part of the South China Sea that has not suffered from over fishing.  

China’s Reaction to the Basing of the Littoral Combat Ship in the South China Sea27

The announcement that the United States intended to forward base some of its Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in Singapore caused consternation in Beijing.  By stationing LCS vessels in Singapore, the United Sates Navy can maintain freedom of the seas, show the flag and assist regional nations in operations other than war.  

They vessels are not designed for blue water combat operations but for operations other than war.  Although large ships they are sparsely armed, but perfect for constabulary and civilian assistance missions being excellent vessels for chasing pirates and inserting teams by both helicopter and boats.  

Their shallow draught; fast transit speeds; spacious interior; advanced sensors and communication facilities; with integral helicopters and rigid inflatable boats (RIBs) provide unrivalled flexibility.  One month could see them acting as a mini-LPH providing medical support of a village up a river or small island; chasing down pirates in the Malacca Strait; hunting insurgents and terrorists in the Philippines; and acting as flag ship for a multi-national force providing escort for vessels in the event of a conflict.  

In an article in the November 2011 issue of Jianzai Wuqi (Shipborne Weapons) titled in English ‘Adding Fuel to the Flames’ ___ American Plan In the South Seas to Deploy Close Seas combat vessel’, reveals China’s displeasure at the deployment.  The final section of the article, sub-titled Zhongguo haijun yali zengda (China’s naval pressure increased large), warned that ‘regional countries should be careful in joining with America’.  It pointed out that ‘the United States now regards the Malacca Strait as vital to its strategic interests, and that the stationing of the LCS, is a precursor to the stationing of ‘stealth bombers’ where the real power lies’. 

Fear of a B-1 Sea Control Aircraft

The PLAN is greatly concerned that the B-1 bomber will be used for the sea control mission armed with the new long range anti-ship missile (LRASM).28  It will be able to carry up to 24 of the missiles internally and replace the B-52 currently used in the same role equipped with the AGM-84D Harpoon anti-shipping missile.

China’s View of Vietnam in the South China Sea – A Synopsis29

On 13 and 14 June 2011, Vietnamese forces defending their islands in the South China Sea moved 130mm and 85mm field guns in anticipation of a Chinese attack.  According to Chinese sources, Vietnam has fortified its islands with 85mm, 57mm, 37mm and 23mm anti-aircraft artillery with the 130mm artillery deployed to provide extra reach.  The 85mm, and especially the 130mm guns would slice through Chinese warships, the guns having a maximum range of 18km and 27km respectively.30  

The article further noted with concern the then recent arrival of the Su-30MKV2 multi-purpose fighters, the Bastion 290km range coastal defence anti-shipping cruise missile system, along with the six Type 686 ‘Kilo’ class submarines. The  first two now undergoing training with the all six due for delivery by 2016.31  Add an impressive array of anti-ship missiles and defences Vietnam is creating an A2/AD capability.  Further four Russian built Gepard class frigates with two more Gepard and two Dutch built corvettes give it a modest but capable surface fleet.

Modern Israeli small arms, the TAR-21 assault rifle, Galil sniping rifles and Mini-Uzi suppressed sub-machine guns have been seen with Vietnam’s special forces  so Vietnam may be seeking further technology from Israel for its army.32

The Chinese have noted that the Vietnamese People’s Navy will be using their once they arrive as a coastguard aggressively enforcing Vietnam’s maritime boundaries by confronting Chinese fishing vessels and forcing them to leave. 33 

The Scarborough Shoals Episode

The Chinese have never been subtle in their propaganda with the Liberation Daily being quite belligerent over China’s claims to the South China Sea.  This photograph accompanied an article about the Philippines updating a pier on one of their islands, which they refer to as Kalayaan Islands in the Spratly Islands archipelago.34 

The transfer of three ex-US Coastguard Hamilton class cutters, to the Philippine Navy has already changed the dynamics of the region.  As they can now stay on station for an extended period the Philippines Navy can now protect its offshore islands against Chinese incursions.  This has upset the Chinese Government as the recent stand-off over fishing near  Scarborough Shoals which the Chinese call Huangyan Island shows.35

It further postulated that the Philippines would allow United States naval forces to operate from there after having been cool to the idea for many years.  Subsequently the Philippine Government announcing that, ‘It is to our definite advantage to be exploring how to maximize our treaty alliance with the United States in ways that would be mutually acceptable and beneficial’.36

When the Jiefangjun Bao (People’s Liberation Army Daily) announced ASEAN’s decision to agree as a whole to dispute China’s claim to the South China Sea, its tone was conciliatory.37 There was none of the rhetoric which had been seen when over discussing Vietnamese and  Philippine claims and fishing incidents.

The introduction into the Philippine navy of the ex-US Coast Guard Hamilton class cutters, and the Philippine Air Force looking at purchasing a new multi-role lead-in fighter, the way is open for European defence firms to establish a stranglehold on defence contracts in the Philippines. 

The Hamilton class cutters were supplied with the 3D radar and  Vulcan-Phalanx close-in-weapons-system removed.  European suppliers would be lining up to supply replacement systems to fit these ships and possibly anti-shipping missiles. 

The Philippines government wants two squadrons of fighters as new build aircraft, and not second hand F-16s’  President Aquino is reported as saying, ‘We are going to spend at least $400 million or $800 million per squadron – and we are thinking of two. There is an alternative that we might acquire – this is a bit surprising – it seems we have the capacity to buy brand new, not from America’. 38 

President Aquino further noted that the lead-in trainers can be converted to fighters at a later date. Colonel Miguel Okol is quoted as saying that ‘the new fighter jets should be supersonic, have multifunction displays and be equipped with an on board oxygen generation system.39

The requirement appears to be written around the Korean Aerospace Industries TA-50 Golden Eagle supersonic lead-in trainer/light attack aircraft, sixteen having already been ordered by Indonesia.   The possibility of surplus Eurofighters from Italy and Spain should not be discounted as part of a package including upgrading the ex-Hamilton class cutters.

Future Developments

Space will continue to be the area where China will continue to try and gain an edge over US forces.  There are now three space launching centres and the recent launch of the Yaogan-20, three ‘remote sensing’ satellites, was seen as upgrade to its naval targeting systems tracking ships through their electronic emissions via triangulation.40

China is trying, through remote sensors, and long range weapons to deny uncontested access and deny the use of the South (and East) China Seas to US naval surface forces, primarily aircraft carrier battle groups and B-1 and B-2 bombers out of Guam.

Appendix: PLAN Seapower

A PLAN Carrier Battle Group

Chinese Aircraft Carrier Air Wing41

Recent photographs show that the new Chinese aircraft carrier is similar is size to the Liaoning meaning when sufficient J-15Bs and pilots become available, the normal strike wing will comprise between 18 to 20 J-15Bs with some six Ka-31 or Z-8 airborne early warning helicopters.42  

Currently the Liaoning embarks a mix of Z-8, Ka-28 anti-submarine and Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters and possibly Z-9C ASW/OTHT/ASMW helicopters along with a small amount of trials J-15/B aircraft. The PLAN regards both the Russian built Ka-28 and the Ka-31 as stop gaps until more Chinese built Z-8 ASW and AEW versions are built.  Due to the contra-rotating helicopters and being designed from the start to operate off warships, the Ka-31only uses 50% of the deck area of the Z-8, whereas the Z-9C uses 66% meaning two Ka-31 s can be carried for the same space of a Z-8 and three Z-9Cs for two Z-8s.  

The Type 52D destroyers are earmarked for aircraft carrier protection as ‘Imperial Bodyguards’.  The Type 52D combines naval gunfire support, area air defence and long range surface strike capability for am would still require one or two Type 52C and D air warfare destroyers, two or three modern frigates and an underway replenishment ship.

As the Falklands showed, if a credible submarine and air threat exists, the PLAN 

Fixed Wing 

In November 2012, the Chinese aircraft carrier the Liaoning conducted successful arrested landings and ski-jump take-offs using clean J-15Bs.43  The Initial operating capability was meant to be 2016 but the IOC of the J-15B is still 2014 and the Z-8s still need to be installed and the PLAN are talking of a four or five year time frame before a carrier battle group is operational. 

The J-15B strike fighter, developed from a copy of the Su-33 is equipped with the J-11B avionics and is due to become operational in 2014.44  Designed to be as capable as the Su-30MKI’ it incorporates a new indigenous AESA radar; composites in the airframe; a ‘glass’ cockpit using multifunction displays; and on board oxygen and nitrogen generators instead of bottles.  This has resulted in a 1100kg drop in its empty  weight.45

The J-15B will be powered by two Chinese built WS-10 turbofans, a copy of the Russian AL-31F engines used in the Su-33.  In air combat with half fuel, two PL-8 and two PL-12 air-to-air missiles the J-15B has a slightly higher transonic speed of Mach 1.1 compared to the Su-33 at Mach 1.08. 

Weapons for the J-15B include the PL-8 short-range and PL-12 beyond visual range air-to-air missiles and the Russian Kh-31 and Chinese YJ-83 anti-ship missiles. 

The new carriers are planned to be equipped with a navalised variant of the J-20 twin engine stealth fighter with folding wings.  A twin seat version is also planned.  

Four PL-12 long range air-to-air missiles can be carried in the internal weapons of the J-20, or two tonnes of other ordnance.  These will include a 150kg satellite guided bomb using the FT-1 kit; a 500 kg satellite guided bomb using the FT-1 kit; a 1000kg using both satellite and semi-active laser guidance using the LT-3 kit; and a ‘supersonic small anti-ship missile’ under development.

Operations at sea

When operating the J-15B the PLAN aims to have the deck cleared to land aircraft using the arrestor wires in a maximum of six minutes.46  

The landing pattern is planned to take two minutes with a bolter (an aircraft that fails to catch an arrestor wire) to be back again within a minute. At 1,400 metres from the carrier it enters the glide slope at an approach speed of 125 knots.  If it fails to catch a wire it slowly rises to an altitude of 360 meters and 150 knots air speed to re-enter the landing pattern.   

A cloth arrestor barrier can be erected between arrestor wires three and four.  

TYPE 052D AIR DEFENCE DESTROYER WEAPONS SYSTEMS47

The ‘Imperial Bodyguard’ is the PLAN’s equivalent of the United States Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, and was developed from the Type 052C.  

060906-N-4856G-021 Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (September 06, 2006)… The Chinese Navy destroyer Qingdao (DDG 113) steams its way through the Pearl Harbor channel… Ben A. Gonzales (RELEASED)

Missiles

The ship is to be equipped with eight sets of vertical launchers, each of eight cells, similar to U.S. Navy’s Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS).  Six sets mounted forward of the bridge and abaft the 130mm automatic cannon and four sets in front of the rear hangar. 


Each cell can house either a vertically launched version of the CJ-10  land attack cruise missile; a YJ-62 300km range anti-ship cruise missile, an 800 series anti-ship missile; a HHQ-16 short-range air defence missile; and the HHQ-9 area air-defence missile which is its primary weapon.  The ship is designed to  operate as an escort for the new Chinese aircraft carrier and LPDs, as well as independently as the command vessel for a naval task force and is able to provide independent strike or naval gunfire support.


The vessel will have a layered air defence system for self-protection as well as providing area air defence.  The primary air defence  missile is the HHQ-9 based on the 48N6E missile used with the Russian S-300 system.  The short range HHQ-16 can also be fitted based on the Russian SA-N-12 Shtil naval surface-to-air missile system currently used on the PLAN’s Type 054A frigates but as it uses the same space as a larger missiles, it is more efficient for the fleet that the ship  carries larger missiles and depends on escorts and its own self- defence suite. 

Against close in threats the ships will be fitted with a 22 cell HHQ-10 (previously known as the FLN-3000N) short range anti-ship missile defence system atop the hangar; and a updated Type 730 30mm CIWS forward of the bridge The HHQ-10 system has a maximum speed of Mach 2.5, a minimum engagement range of 500m, a maximum engagement range that exceeds 6km and a maximum range of 1km.48

For ASW protection there is a hangar and flight deck for currently a Z-9C.  The Type 52D is also equipped with two sets of updated 324mm triple torpedo tubes for the Yu-7 torpedo.

CJ-10/DF-10 Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM)

The DF-10 land attack cruise missile is the naval equivalent of the CJ-10.49 It has different nose geometry and inlet arrangement than the YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile, and is similar in shape to the RGM-109 Tomahawk. The CJ-10s rear folding control surfaces and rocket booster appear similar if not identical to the YJ-62. A copy of photograph from the Chinese defence magazine shows two CJ-10 box launchers joined side by side on a Type 52C destroyer.  The YJ-62 is already mounted on some of China’s warships so this was to be expected.  

Guns

The Type 730 30mm has an effective rate of fire of 4,200 rounds-per-minute and complements the HHQ-10 by providing protection against ‘leakers’, initially engaging them  between 1000 to 1,500m.   

A fully automatic H/PJ-38 130mm cannon is to be mounted forward of the VLS and will have a maximum effective range of 19km and a maximum range of 30km.  A maximum rate-of-fire of not less than 30 rounds per minute is envisaged.

Electronic Warfare 

The PLAN is introducing into service the Type 726-4 EW nine tube launchers, the Chinese equivalent of the Mk36 Super RBOC.50 It has been fitted to the four early Type 52  destroyers during their recent refits and the program will see it fitted initially to the entire Type 52 destroyer and Type 54 frigate fleets, along with the four Type 071 LPDs.

Z-20 Naval Variant51

Based on the SH-60B ASW helicopter, the navalised variant of the Z-20 currently under development will replace the Ka-28 and the Z-9C where the hangar space allows it on escort vessels. The People’s Liberation Army Navy aims to have it  into service in 2018 initially equipping the Type 054A class frigates. It will be equipped with a laser designator/rangefinder and FLIR in a turret, an under floor radar and the crew will have a hand held CCD camera. 

The radius of the helicopter is approximately 80km in the ASW role, similar to the Ka-28, carrying two lightweight ASW torpedoes. As well as the 25 cell sonobuoy discharger it will be able to carry a variety of dipping sonars with the sonobuoy search area being a 20km radius.

In the anti-shipping and surface strike roles the helicopter has a radius over 100km.  It will carry the TL-10 lightweight anti-shipping missile and for ground strike missions, the Lan Jian (Blue Arrow) -7 semi active laser homing missile.  A development of the HJ-10 anti-tank guided missile it is analogous to the AGM-114N Hellfire. It has a range of around 8km and the warhead can penetrate up to 1,400mm of armour plate.

Type 055 Destroyer52

Currently under design it is known that the Type 055 destroyer will use  combined diesel and gas turbine (CODAG) propulsion system, with a planned full load displacement of 12,000, an overall length of 183m and a 22m beam. Armament will comprise from the bow to stern, a H/PJ-38 130mm cannon, a 64 cell VLS, HHQ-10 ASSM, two 25mm automatic cannon either side f the funnel, two 30mm Type 730 CIWS behind that a 64 cell VLS and a HHQ-10 on top of hangar which can house two Z-20 helicopters.  The shipborne radar is reported to be an active phased array radar.

The Type 055 is similar to the Arleigh Burke Flight IIA with more missiles in the vertical launchers. 

Type 56 Light ‘Economy’ Frigate53

Properly called a corvette, Type 056 vessels will perform the myriad of roles the Second World War British Flower class corvettes did.  Classed as a light ‘economy’ frigate wherever possible, systems used on other PLAN vessels are fitted. Including  These include the  Type 347G fire control radar, YJ-803 anti-ship missiles 324mm triple torpedo tubes and the FL-3000N ASSM. On the Type 56 the FL-3000N launcher only has eight missiles and the vessel has a rear flight deck for a Z-9 size helicopter but no hangar.  With a draught of only four metres it can be used for littoral patrol so the Type 56 mounts two 30mm automatic cannon with stabilised  FLIR, one either side of the deck forward of the funnel to defeat threats like speed boats packed with explosives, and similar and larger vessels armed with recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns and rocket propelled grenades. 

Type 057 Frigate54

The Type 057 frigate will have a standard displacement of 4500t and a full load displacement of 5000t.  The armament will include a  PJ-25 stealth turret  76mm gun, 16 cell VLS as used on the Type 52D with twin packed HHQ-16 medium range surface-to-air missiles and CY-3 rocket assisted torpedoes , two sets of 324mm triple torpedo tubes  and most likely two Z-20 helicopters.  The frigates are designed to operate in the South China Sea.

China’s ‘White’ Fleet Larger Vessels55 

Search and rescue and the  protection and enforcement of Recent events in the East and South China Seas has highlighted that China’s exclusive economic zone currently comes under five separate departments which are known as the ‘White Fleet; from the colour of their hulls and superstructure. 

Five separate departments leads to duplication of effort, problems in coordination, no economies of scale  and ‘turf wars’.  This had led to calls for the Departments to come under a single maritime authority’ authority.56  Nicknamed the ‘Five Dragons’, they are:

  1. the China Coast Guard Zhongguo Haijing   中国海警 under the Ministry of Public Security; 
  2. the China Maritime Safety Administration Zhongguo Haishijui 中国海事局 which coordinates maritime search and rescue in China’s territorial waters. It is responsible to the Ministry of Transport:
  3. the China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command Zhongguo Haizheng 中国渔政 under the Fisheries Management Bureau of the  Ministry of Agriculture: 
  4. the China Marine Surveillance Zhongguo Haijian 中国海监 which operates under the State Oceanic Administration;
  5. China Customs Zhongguo Haiguan 中国海关 which operates operating an operates a maritime anti-smuggling force. 

Three vessels are looked at as representative of the combat capable of the vessels.57

The China Maritime Surveillance’s  Number ’83’ 3,000 ton patrol vessel has an overall length of 98m, a beam of  15.2m, and a  full load of 3980t  and a range of 10,000 nautical miles (NM) at its maximum speed of 18 knots.  It carries one Z-9C helicopter on a  ship with a very high freeboard and rather square superstructure reminiscent of a LPD.

The China Coast Guard’s two modified Type 053F patrol vessels are the only vessels currently armed with automatic cannon.  Numbered 1001 and 1002 they have an overall length of 92m, a beam of  12m, and a  full load of 1,600t  they have a range of 4000NM at 18 knots and a maximum speed of 20 knots.  

They look more like a 1950 and 60s Greek shipping magnate’s yacht than a petrol vessel, the Type 61 twin 37mm AAA turret the obvious difference.

The China Maritime Surveillance’s new 5,000 ton patrol vessel numbered 01 has an overall length of 108m, a beam of  14m, and a  full load of 5400t  and a 10,000NM at 18 knots and a maximum speed of 22 knots.  


It has a substantial superstructure and carries one Type Z-9 helicopter which appears too small for a ship with such a large superstructure and substantial flight deck which could easily land a larger helicopter.

Anti-access/Area Denial missions

Despite not being combat vessels, the exploits of HMS Endurance an ice patrol ship during the 1982 Battle for the Falkland’s showed what such a  vessel can achieve.  

Equipped with two 20mm Oerlikon pintle mounted automatic guns and two tiny Wasp HAS1  helicopters armed with 1950’s era wire-guided AS-12 missiles; its helicopters assisted in disabling the Argentinian submarine Santa Fe and transferred Royal Marines to retake South Georgia Island.

Larger Chinese civilian vessels are equipped and Z-9 helicopters, larger and several generations ahead of the old Wasp.  Some mount 12.7 x 108mm heavy machine guns and the two Type 053H frigates modified for the Coast Guard carry vessels carry one Type 61 37mm twin  open top turret forward..

The vessels equipped with the Z-9C helicopter would be able to disable or sink vessels up to frigate size when armed with their typical load of four TL-10 anti-ship guided missiles; or two 57mm x 19 rocket or 20mm cannon pods.  A 12.7 x 108mm heavy machine gun can be mounted inside the cabin.

Further the Z-9C is being developed into the Z-9D equipped with up to four TL-10 lightweight anti-shipping missiles. designed for use against patrol boat and corvette sized vessels.58

A Chinese Haifan II helicopter from the missile frigate ‘Zhoushan’ leaves the flight deck of HMS Cornwall. Members of the Chinese Public Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) were visiting the Type 22 frigate to discuss anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

The TL-10A and B use the same body and engine, are 2.5 m long, 0.18m wide, and weigh 105kg with a 30kg warhead.  They cruise at Mach 0.85 and have a maximum range of 15km. The difference is that the TL-10A uses an autonomous electro-optical seeker to acquire its target, whereas the TL-10B uses an autonomous radar seeker.  Capable of being launched 15m above the sea, the TL-10B missile has been fitted to the Z-9C. The TL-10C with an advanced guidance system is under development.

PLAN Marine Commandos

Included here for sake of completeness the Chinese coast guard vessels could easily embark PLAN marines/special forces personnel protecting the Chinese vessels on anti-piracy and boarding parties carry Type 95 5.8 x42mm assault rifle with some equipped with the QLG91/Type 91 35mm underbarrel grenade launcher; QBU-88 5.8 x 42mm, Type 85 7.62 x 54mmR and 12.7mm x 108mm sniping rifles and there are 12.7 x 108mm Type 89 heavy machine guns mounted on stands connected to the decks of frigates and other PLAN vessels for very close anti-small vessel protection.59

PACIFIC OCEAN (July 20, 2016) – Sailors from the guided-missile destroyer USS Stockdale (DDG 106) talk with Chinese navy sailors from the guided-missile destroyer Xian (153) after a VBSS (Visit, board, search, and seizure) exercise for Rim of the Pacific 2016… photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class David A. Cox

Author Biography

Dr. Martin Andrew hails from the land down-under, and attained B.A. degrees (plural) in International Relations and Strategic Studies from Deakin University; a Masters Degree in South East Asian Studies from Northern Territory University; and a PhD from Bond University where he wrote his dissertation titled Tuo Mao: The Operational History of the People’s Liberation Army. A long-time PLA-watcher, Dr. Andrew served in the Royal Australian Air Force from February 1977 to February 2005, and is the publisher of GI Zhou Newsletter – a monthly compilation of translated Chinese and Russian source material pertaining to the Chinese military. He is the author of How the PLA Fights: Weapons and Tactics of the People’s Liberation Army, a “warfighter’s handbook” with customers in the US Army (the most recent edition of which will be published here at Analytica Camillus in the near future); The Guerrilla’s Artillery – The RPG in Action in Eurasia, and dozens of academic papers, the list of which you can see here.

End Notes

  1. The original paper was presented at a China’s Defense Modernization roundtable discussion at the Nixon Center Washington DC on 26 October 2010 Closed Door Session. A pdf of the original document (with footnotes, instead of endnotes) can be accessed here.
  2. ‘China reiterates “indisputable” sovereignty over South China Sea islands’, China Military Online (Source: Xinhua), 31 July 2010, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2010-07/31/content_4270308.htm accessed 1 August 2010.
  3. ‘U.S. involvement will only complicate South China Sea issue’, China Military Online, (Source: Xinhua), 28 July 2010, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2010-07/28/content_4267945.htm accessed 1 August 2010.
  4. Zhong Jijun Li Tang.  ‘Tian yashao bingchizi qing ___ Ji haijun xin shashang shuiqu jiandao shoubadui’, Jiefangjun bao, 10 August 2012  http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jwjj/2012-08/06/content_4982574.htm accessed 6 August 2012
  5. ‘China tells US to stay out of south sea dispute’, Borneo Bulletin, Volume 15, Number 71, 22 September 2010, p. 24.
  6. ‘His Majesty in New York for 2nd Asean-US Summit’, Borneo Bulletin, Volume 15, Number 73, 24 September pp. 1 & 16; ‘US, Asean leaders vow closer ties’ and ‘No mention of S. China Sea, just maritime security’, Sunday Times, 26 September 2010, p. 6.
  7. ‘Greater cooperation looms’, The Brunei Times , Volume 4, Number 82, 22 September 2010, pp. A1 & A2.
  8. The International Law Students Association at University of Indonesia, after the awarding of the islands of Sipitan and Ligitan to Malaysia, vowed never again would Indonesia be represented by ill-prepared lawyers as occurred in this case.  These lawyers are excellent, being well read in the ancient philosophers as well as the classics of English and American Literature, and International Law.  They regularly win international competitions on international law.
  9. Achong Tanjong.  ‘RBAF officers enhance skills through courses’, Borneo Bulletin, Volume 15, Number 71, 22 September 2010, p. 24.
  10. A ballistic missile with a maximum range less than 1,000km is classed as a short ranged ballistic missile (SRBM).  A MRBM has a maximum range from 1,000km to 2,500km and an IRBM above 2,500km to 5,500km.
  11. “CNMD” Liangxiangle! ___ Jiedu Woguo chuci fadao dangjie shiyan’, Tanke zhuangjia cheliang, 2010 Niandi, 3 Qi, Zhongdi 303, pp. 50 – 53
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  15. Papp, D.S.  ‘From Project Thumper to SDI: The Role of Ballistic Missile Defense in US Security Policy’, Airpower Journal, Volume One, Number Three, pp. 35 – 51.
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  20. ‘Leili Fengxing ___ Zhongguo zhongyuan cheng kongdi daodan ji kondi pingtai jishu biange’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2013 Niandi, 9 Qi, Zhongdi 177, pp. 6 – 8 & 28 – 43; ‘Zhongguo daxing faji fazhan licheng’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2013 Niandi, 7 Qi, Zhongdi 173, p. 46.
  21. ‘Bihui wuwen long Zhongguo tangqui qiantingde jishu biange he zuozhan xuqui’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2013 Niandi, 11 Qi, Zhongdi 181, p. 7.
  22. Zhong Jijun Li Tang.,  ‘End of the World Sentinel Motherland – Naval Xisha Water District to build the island garrison’, PLA Daily, 10 August 2012 [http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jwjj/2012-08/10/content _4988001_2.htm dead link] accessed 10 August 2012
  23. ‘His Majesty in New York for 2nd Asean-US Summit’, Borneo Bulletin, Volume 15, Number 73, 24 September pp. 1 & 16; ‘US, Asean leaders vow closer ties’ and ‘No mention of S. China Sea, just maritime security’, Sunday Times, 26 September 2010, p. 6.
  24. ‘Greater cooperation looms’, The Brunei Times , Volume 4, Number 82, 22 September 2010, pp. A1 & A2.
  25. The International Law Students Association at University of Indonesia, after the awarding of the islands of Sipitan and Ligitan to Malaysia, vowed never again would Indonesia be represented by ill-prepared lawyers as occurred in this case.  These lawyers are excellent, being well read in the ancient philosophers as well as the classics of English and American Literature, and International Law.  They regularly win international competitions on international law.
  26. Achong Tanjong.  ‘RBAF officers enhance skills through courses’, Borneo Bulletin, Volume 15, Number 71, 22 September 2010, p. 24.
  27. ‘Tuibozhulan ___ Meijun ni zai nahai bushu binhai zhantou jian’,  Jianzai Wuqi, 2011 Niandi,11 Qi, Zhongdi 147, pp. 12-18.
  28. ‘“Moji huohuo” Xiang jianhu ___ Meiguo zhongshi fazhen fanjianhu daodan ji fanjianhu zuozhan’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2012 Niandi, 11 Qi, Zhongdi 159, pp. 57 – 65‘“Yingji”-100 yu Zhongguo yuancheng  fajian daodande fazhan’,  daodan ji kondi pingtai jishu biange’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2014 Niandi, 6 Qi, Zhongdi 195, pp. 41 & 42.
  29. ‘Jianzhi nansha ___ Yuejun zai nanhai zhengjun jingwu’, Tanke zhuangjia cheliang, 2011 Niandi, 8A Qi, Zhongdi 337, pp. 49 – 52.
  30. Foss, Christopher F.  Jane’s Armour and Artillery 1983-84, Jane’s Yearbooks, London, 1983, pp. 630 & 693.
  31. Zachary Abuza, ‘Vietnam’s Naval Upgrades Likely Will Limit but not Deter China in the South China Sea’, CognitASIA, CSIS, 12 September 2014, http://cogitasia.com/vietnams-naval-upgrades-likely-will-limit-but-not-deter-china-in-the-south-china-sea/ accessed 27 September 2014.
  32. ‘Yuejun tezhong budui zhuangbei’, Qing Bingqi, 2014 Niandi, 7 (shang) Qi, Zhongdi 418, pp. 30-33.
  33. ‘Jianzhi nansha ___ Yuejun zai nanhai zhengjun jingwu’, loc. cit.
  34. ‘Ywai dongtai: Feilubin yuzai Nansha Daoyu xujian matou’, Jiefangjun Bao, 22 March 2012, http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jwjj/2012-03/22/content_4817326.htm accessed 22 March 2012
  35. ‘Chinese fishing boats leave Huangyan Island’, China Military Online,(Source: Xinhua)   15 April 2012, [http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/ today-headlines/2012-04/15/content_ 4835188.htm dead link] accessed 16 April 2012.
  36. Mynardo Macaraig, ‘Philippines Agrees to Larger U.S. Troop Presence’, Agence France-Press in Defense News, 27 January 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120127/DEFREG03/301270002/Philippines-Agrees-Larger-U-S-Troop-Presence accessed 30 January 2011.
  37. ‘Dongmeng jiu jiejue nanyang wenticheng yizhi lichang’, jiefangjun bao,21 July 2012,  http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jwjj/2012-07/21/content_4964599.htm accessed 22 July 2012
  38. Aurea Calica.  ‘Aquino: Government can now afford to buy new fighter jets’, Philippine Star,  17 May  2012, http://www.philstar.com/Article/aspx?publicationSubCategoryId=63&articleId=807763 accessed 29 May 2012.
  39. Chichi Conde.  ‘Philippines to buy brand-new jet fighter, but not necessarily from US’, ,InterAksyon.com, 16 May 2012,  http://www.interaksyon. com/article/32086/philippines-to-buy-brand-new-jet-fighter-but -not-necessarily-from-us accessed 29 May 2012.
  40. Andrew Tate. ‘China launches latest of military, ‘experimental’ satellites’, HIS Jane’s 360,  http://www.janes.com/article/43785/china-launches-latest-of-military-experimental-satellites accessed 1 October 2014.
  41. Binglu Nanti ___ “Wuliangge” haozai Zhongguo xiandai haijubn zhuangbei shngde nanti he jingpo’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2012 Niandi, 4 Qi, Zhongdi 152, pp. 24 – 31.
  42. ‘Zhongguo hanhmu jianzai jide’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2014 Niandi, 5 Qi, Zhongdi 191, p. 42.
  43. ‘“ Liaoning  Jian” Chuhai xunlian he keyan shiyan maichu guanjian   yibu’, Jiefangjun Huabao online,  25 November 2012.
  44. Zhonghua haili Zhongjian’, Bingqi, 2011 Niandi, 12 Qi, Zhongdi 151, pp. 33 & 34.
  45. Yin he:  Dayang feisha ___ Jian-15 jishu tedian he  zuozhan yingyong’,  Jianzai Wuqi, 2014 Niandi, 7 Qi, Zhongdi 197, pp. 6 – 8 & 24 – 37.
  46. ‘Zhongguo hangmu zhaojian zinan’, Xiande Jianghuan , 2012 Niandi, 08-2 Qi, Zhongdi 450, pp. 14 & 15.
  47. ‘Cong mengxiang dao xianshi ___  Cong 052C dao 052Dde jishu yanbian di fazhan’,  Jianzai Wuqi, 2012 Niandi, 11 Qi, Zhongdi 159, pp. 17 – 27.
  48. ‘052D xiang xinqu: Zhongguo jianmu bianduide qian nengdai daoshi wei’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2014 Niandi, 03 Qi, Zhongdi 189, pp. 1 & 37.
  49. ‘Rimei: Zhongguo shishe dui gongji xunjian daodan huoyou shenyi’,Jiefangjun huabao’, Jiefangjun huabao,1 August2012, http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/jwjj/2012-8/01/content_4978614.htm accessed 2 August 2012.
  50. ‘Xinshi qi Zhonggua haijun fazhaahan    zhuangbeide zhuyao  tedingyu  fazhen qushi’,  Jianzai Wuqi, 2014 Niandi, 8 Qi, Zhongdi 199 Qi, p. 40.
  51. ‘Zhi-20: Gaizhuang  Jianzai xiang tonting’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2014 Niandi, 03 Qi, Zhongdi 189, pp. 6 & 19 – 26; ‘Zhongguo haijunde shuimian fanqianzhan (xia)’,  op.cit, p. 45.
  52. ‘Shi xuixi sou 052D “Qian jia fu” Liangxiang de neice’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2014 Niandi, 10 Qi, Zhongdi 203, p. 17; ‘Daxing shuimian zhantou jianting’, Bingqi Zhishi, 2015 Niandi, 2 Qi, Zhongdi 370, pp. 23-35.
  53. ‘056de jing xing’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2013 Niandi, 7 Qi, Zhongdi 173, pp. 30 – 34; ‘Zhongguo haijun shuimian zuozhan jiantingde yanzhi luoji’, op. cit. p. 50.
  54. ‘Daxing shuimian zhantou jianting’, op. cit., p. 24
  55. ‘Cong Daioyudao wentikan ZhongRi Gongwu fajiande fazhan’,   Jianzai Wuqi, 2013 Niandi, 4 Qi, Zhongdi 167, pp. 6 – 8 & 35 – 46.
  56. Gong Jianhua,  ‘Need for unified coast guard’, China Daily, 19 April 2013, p.9.
  57. ‘Cong diaoyudao wenti kan ZhongRi gongwu zhifa chuande fazhan’,  Jianzai Wuqi, 2013 Niandi, 4 Qi, Zhongdi 167, pp. 35 – 36.
  58. ‘Haisheng feihuo ___ Zishengji zai fanjian daodan Zhongguo haijun zhongyao yiyi’, Jianzai Wuqi, 2012 Niandi, 3 Qi, Zhongdi 151, pp. 44 – 50.
  59. ‘Zhonnguo haijun huajian biandui qingwuqi zhuangbei yu wunlian jiangying’, Qing Bingqi, 2012 Niandi,12 (shang) Qi, Zhongdi 380, pp. 2 & 3.

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